"We should not do the following:
1. Tamiflu and vaccine stockpiling have their roles but they should not form the centerpiece of a plan. In addition to the medical limitations of these investments, institutional factors will restrict our ability to allocate these supplies promptly to their proper uses.
2. We should not rely on quarantines and mass isolations. Both tend to be counterproductive and could spread rather than limit a pandemic.
3. We should not expect the Army or Armed Forces to be part of a useful response plan.
4. We should not expect to choke off a pandemic in its country of origin. Once a pandemic has started abroad, we should shut schools and many public places immediately.
5. We should not obsess over avian flu at the expense of other medical issues. The next pandemic or public health crisis could come from any number of sources. By focusing on local preparedness and decentralized responses, this plan is robust to surprise and will also prove useful for responding to terrorism or natural catastrophes."
Tuesday, November 15, 2005
Have you been hearing about the avian flu? Are you wondering what public policy should be regarding avian flu? You might be interested in Tyler Cowen's analysis. He has several suggestions for what to do. Here are his don'ts: